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Abstract
At least some ancient civilizations used various risk-management strategies to minimize price
volatility. In this article, we examine one such strategy, grain storage, by means of a dataset
recently made available that provides agricultural prices for Babylonia during the Late Achae-
menid and Hellenistic periods (c.400–65 BCE). A comparative analysis of medieval England
and Hellenistic Babylonia reveals a low level of inter-annual storage in both economies, and helps
us to compare the costs and benefits in each society. Costs are largely equated with interest
rates, and benefits with seasonal price changes. Unlike in England, Babylonia’s dual crop struc-
ture (barley and dates) reduced seasonality and thus the potential benefits of storage. There is
no evidence, however, that storage costs – that is, interest rates – were likewise lower. This sug-
gests that interest rates were primarily determined in the urban and commercial sectors, not the
agricultural one. Consequently, measures of seasonal price changes in pre-modern economies
may tell us relatively little about interest rates. While the McCloskey–Nash methodology may
be helpful in analysing particular economies, it is perhaps of limited use for comparing them.
Keywords ancient and medieval economies, Babylon, England, risk reduction, storage
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Introduction
Market efficiency – defined as the capability of markets to use trade, technology, and/or
storage techniques to reduce the risk of shortage – has in recent years become the focus of
considerable attention.1 With the exception of medieval England,2 however, quantifications
of the magnitude of storage have rarely been attempted for pre-industrial societies.3 This is
in spite of the often rich evidence found for many societies – from Nigeria c.600 BCE to the
Inca empire to classical Rome.4 This can partially be explained by a lack of quantifiable
data, that is, prices.5 Fortunately, a dataset for the city of Babylon, only recently made avail-
able, allows precisely such an analysis for the second half of the first millennium BCE, the
so-called Hellenistic era, when the region fell under the sway of Alexander the Great and
his successors, known collectively as the Seleucid dynasty. The data are available from the
‘Astronomical diaries’.6 These cuneiform tablets recorded a variety of observed celestial, cli-
matic, ecological, and economic phenomena, alongside accounts of historical events. One of
the largest collections of observational data available from any ancient period in world his-
tory, they consist of hundreds of tablets spanning several hundred years (c.400–60 BCE).
Among the economic information that they contain are price quotations of, inter alia, barley
1 See, for example, Karl-Gunnar Persson, Grain markets in Europe, 1500–1900: integration and
deregulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Peter Temin, ‘Price behavior in ancient
Babylon’, Explorations in Economic History, 39, 1, 2002, pp. 46–60; Roman Studer, ‘India and the great
divergence: assessing the efficiency of grain markets in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century India’, Journal
of Economic History, 68, 2, 2008, pp. 393–437.
2 See Stefano Fenoaltea, ‘Risk, transaction costs, and the organization of medieval agriculture’,
Explorations in Economic History, 13, 2, 1976, pp.129–51; Stefano Fenoaltea, ‘Transaction costs, Whig
history, and the common fields’, Politics & Society, 16, 2–3, 1988, pp. 171–240; Donald N. McCloskey
and John Nash, ‘Corn at interest: the extent and cost of grain storage in medieval England’, American
Economic Review, 74, 1, 1984, pp. 174–87; John Komlos and Richard Landes, ‘Anachronistic
economics: grain storage in medieval England’, Economic History Review, 44, 1, 1991, pp. 36–45;
Donald N. McCloskey, ‘Conditional economic history: a reply to Komlos and Landes’, Economic
History Review, 44, 1, 1991, pp. 128–32; Nicholas Poynder, ‘Grain storage in theory and history’,
unpublished paper for third conference of European Historical Economics Society, Lisbon, 1999; Jordan
Claridge and John Langdon, ‘Storage in medieval England: the evidence from purveyance accounts,
1295–1349’, Economic History Review, forthcoming, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1468-0289.2010.00564.x/full (consulted 10 April 2011).
3 Exceptions are, for example, Kenneth Pomeranz, The making of a hinterland: state, society, and economy
in inland north China, 1853–1937, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 32–3.
4 See, for example, Giovanna Vitelli, ‘Grain storage and urban growth in imperial Ostia: a quantitative
study’,World Archaeology, 12, 1, 1980, pp. 54–68; Terry Y. Levine, Inka storage systems, Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1992; Detlef Groneborn, ‘An ancient storage pit in the SW Chad Basin,
Nigeria’, Journal of Field Archaeology, 24, 1997, pp. 431–9.
5 Important studies of price data of antiquity include Dominic Rathbone, ‘Prices and price formation in
Roman Egypt’, in J. Andreau, P. Briant, and R. Descat, eds., E´conomie antique: prix et formation des
prix dans les e´conomies antiques, Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges: Muse´e arche´ologique de´partemental,
1997, pp.183–244; Gary Reger, Regionalism and change in the economy of independent Delos, Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1994; Sitta von Reden, ‘Price fluctuations in Babylonia, Egypt, and
the Mediterranean world, third to first centuries BC’, unpulished paper for ‘Too Many Data?
Generalizations and Model-building in Ancient Economic History on the Basis of Large Corpora of
Documentary Evidence’ conference, Vienna, 17–19 July 2008.
6 H. Hunger and A. Sachs, Astronomical diaries and related texts from Babylonia, 3 vols, Vienna: Verlag
der O¨sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 1, 652– 262 BC, 1988; vol. 2, 261–165 BC,
1989; vol. 3, 164–61 BC, 1996.
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and dates, Babylon’s two main staple crops.7 In theory, reliable data (in some cases multiple
observations) are available for every month, but in fact, on account of numerous gaps in the
documentation, price data for barley are available for only 13.76% (or 535 out of 3,887) of
the months spanned by the dataset. As for dates, the percentage is slightly lower, at 12.58%.
Fo¨ldva´ri and van Leeuwen contend, however, that the missing data are ‘missing at random’
and therefore uncorrelated with our key variable: seasonality.8
In the pages that follow we use this unique dataset to compare storage in Hellenistic
Babylon and medieval England. Scarcity of data is always a problem when it comes to his-
torical research, and our decision to compare the market mechanisms operating in these two
societies is largely a consequence of the existence of these data. This issue is, in fact, of little
consequence, however, since it turns out that what we are able to glean from the data con-
cerning risk-reduction strategies can be extended to pre-industrial societies generally. This
generalization follows from the difference between the two societies. Although we are deal-
ing with a pair of societies that, being agrarian, did not need to import basic foodstuffs,
there the similarity ends. It is the difference between their crop structures that enables us
to test the validity of the McCloskey–Nash storage model for pre-industrial economies in
general, and to assess its cross-regional value.
According to McCloskey and Nash, the price that a given season’s grain commands after
the harvest must exceed the price that it had commanded prior to the harvest by a sum equal
to the marginal cost of its storage.9 On the one hand, if there is a profit in storing grain, and
thereby delaying its sale, this will be done. On the other hand, if this causes the post-harvest
price to fall so far that the storage profit margin shrinks to nothing, the post-harvest price
must cover the cost of storage: more specifically, of foregone investment, barn rental, and
loss of stored grain to spoilage.10
Storage seems a straightforward method of risk management, but several studies indicate
that during their pre-industrial period few societies practised it to a significant extent.
McCloskey and Nash, as well as Clark, argue that in England high interest rates signifi-
cantly reduced the financial advantages of storage.11 This explained its rarity.12 As we
show, this argument holds for Babylonia, too, even though the two societies’ agricultural
7 For prior analyses of the data, see Alice L. Slotksy, The bourse of Babylon: market quotations in the
Astronomical diaries of Babylonia, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 1997 (with the important review by
R. J. Van der Spek and C. Mandemakers, ‘Sense and nonsense in the statistical approach of Babylonian
prices’, Bibliotheca Orientalis, 60, 2003, pp. 521–7); Peter Vargyas, Les prix des denre´es alimentaires de
premie`re ne´cessite´ en Babylonie a` l’e´poque ache´menide et helle´nistique, in Andreau, Briant, and Descat,
E´conomie antique, pp. 335–54. For additional price data, see Alice L. Slotksy and Ronald Wallenfels,
Tallies and trends: the late Babylonian commodity price lists, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2010.
8 Peter Fo¨ldva´ri and Bas van Leeuwen, ‘The structural analysis of Babylonian price data: a partial
equilibrium approach’, unpublished paper for World Economic History Congress, Utrecht, 2–7 August
2009.
9 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’. See also Gregory Clark, ‘The cost of capital and medieval
agricultural technique’, Explorations in Economic History, 25, 3, 1988, pp. 265–94; Poynder, ‘Grain
storage’.
10 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’; Poynder, ‘Grain storage’.
11 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’; Clark, ‘Cost of capital’.
12 On the other hand, some authors argue for a much larger role for storage. For example, Stefano
Fenoaltea, ‘Risk’, p. 139, suggests that storage in England could easily be in the order of magnitude of
1.5 times the annual consumption. However, two preconditions for such a high storage rate are sharply
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supply situations were radically different. In England, the outputs of the two main crops,
barley and wheat, were positively (though weakly) correlated, sharing as they did the
same harvest period. It was as if English agriculture was dominated by a single food crop.
Instead of wheat, Babylon cultivated dates, which were harvested in the autumn, and
were thus negatively correlated with the other main crop, barley, harvested in the spring.
This dual crop structure implies that intra-annual price changes, and thus the financial
advantages of storage, were probably reduced.13 Thus, if we assume that the agricultural
sector alone determines the interest rate, storage costs (foregone interest, primarily) must
have been lower as well. In an ancient society such as Babylonia, dominated as it was by
agricultural credit, with the interest rate driving seasonality, one would expect the combina-
tion of a dual crop structure with relatively low seasonal volatility to lead to an interest rate
substantially lower than medieval England’s, but this was not the case. There are two pos-
sible explanations: either the costs of barn rental and crop-storage losses were considerably
lower in Babylon or in both economies – despite their being pre-industrial – the interest rate
was determined by sectors other than agriculture, in which case comparison of their season-
al price changes cannot provide a reliable basis for a comparison of interest rates across eco-
nomies.14
In the following section, we discuss the evidence for storage, the benefits and costs of
storage, and the discrepancy between costs and benefits. In the fifth and last section we offer
our conclusions concerning not only storage in Hellenistic Babylon but also the role of the
interest rate in pre-industrial economies generally.
Evidence for storage
There is little direct evidence for crop storage in pre-industrial societies. A simple model
would suggest that, in order to assure a smooth consumption path, in the case of a single
crop harvested once a year (or two related crops harvested at roughly the same time) the
entire crop was stored for six months, on average. In England prior to the Black Death,
which peaked in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century, we can distinguish barley
and wheat as the two main crops. Broadberry et al. estimate the share of barley and wheat
higher grain-yield variances and the disappearance of the phenomenon of recurrent famine, both of
which are extremely unlikely.
13 Dates played a fundamental part in the dietary habits of the Middle East until well into the twentieth
century. According to a study quoted in Michael Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia in
the first millennium BC: economic geography, economic mentalities, agriculture, the use of money and
the problem of economic growth (with contributions by J. Hackl, B. Jankovic´, K. Kleber, E. E. Payne,
C. Waerzeggers, and M. Weszeli), AOAT 377, Mu¨nster: Ugarit Verlag, 2010, p. 50, an Iraqi small-scale
farmer consumed 65.1 kg of dates a year compared to 75.3 kg of wheat, barley, and rice; the two
commodities together accounted for about two-thirds of total caloric intake. A similar proportion in
antiquity is indicated by the ‘ration’ system of the Ebabbar temple of Sippar, in northern Babylonia,
which ideally provided workers with equal amounts of barley and dates: see M. Jursa, ‘The remuneration
of institutional labourers in an urban context in Babylonia in the first millennium BC’, in P. Briant,
W. F. M. Henkelman, and M. Stolper, eds., L’archive des fortifications de Perse´polis : e´tat des questions
et perspectives de recherches, Persika 12, Paris: De Boccard, 2008.
14 A third possibility, outlined in Komlos and Landes, ‘Anachronistic economics’, is that when it comes to
storage small-scale farmers may be hampered by socioeconomic limitations, even if not by the
opportunity costs to large-scale producers and traders.
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in the total output of England’s arable sector around 1300 to have been close to 60%.15
Winter wheat was harvested in May/June, whereas spring barley was harvested in late
August/September. In the period before the Black Death, barley was milled for flour and
baked into bread, but by 1600, according to Overton and Campbell, only 35% of England’s
total barley output was put to this use. Furthermore, by the late sixteenth century, ‘most
English ale was being brewed from barley, in contrast to the situation 300 years earlier
when significant quantities had been brewed from dredge and oats’.16 It therefore seems
safe to make two assumptions: that barley and wheat were the main foodstuffs before the
Black Death, and that during three seasons out of four – that is, except in summer – the Eng-
lish had to rely on storage.
Babylon was similar to England prior to the Black Death in that it too had two main
crops, barley and dates; but it differed from England in that the two harvest times were
farther apart, in March/April and October. We follow the literature in assuming first that
the shares of the two crops in the diet were roughly equal and second that the two crops
were perfect substitutes.17 It follows that if starvation was to be prevented, in principle
each crop had to be stored for only three months on average – that is, until the harvest of
the other crop. Additionally, we must take into consideration that, whereas the quality of
barley and wheat deteriorates with storage, the quality of dates may actually improve,
and therefore their value may increase. Since fresh dates cannot be stored (they would rot
on account of their high water content), about two months after the harvest dried dates
started to dominate the date market.18 Dried dates have a higher sugar content and a lower
volume than fresh ones. Because dates were sold by volume (per qa, conveniently close to a
litre), soon after the harvest the price started to rise, as the proportion of fresh to dried dates
diminished over time. This seasonality must be factored into any calculation of the costs and
benefits of storage.
Since people have to eat between as well as during harvest periods, every economy needs
at least a basic form of short-term storage system. Given that roughly a twelfth of the crop
harvested is consumed each month, it follows that six months is one harvest’s average stor-
age time, if it were not for the possibility of carryover from one year to the next (inter-
annual storage). According to McCloskey and Nash, there is direct evidence that in medi-
eval England carryovers averaged 5% of the harvest at best and were limited, for the
15 Steve Broadberry, Bruce Campbell, Alex Klein, Mark Overton, and Bas van Leeuwen, ‘British economic
growth, 1300–1850: some preliminary estimates’, unpublished paper for World Economic History
Congress, Utrecht, 2–7 August 2009.
16 Mark Overton and Bruce Campbell, ‘Production et productivite´ dans l’agriculture anglaise, 1086–1871’,
Histoire et Mesure, 11, 3–4, 1996, pp. 255–97, table 12.
17 G. G. Aperghis, The Seleukid royal economy: the finances and financial administration of the Seleukid
empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, and the literature quoted therein; Jursa, Aspects.
See also the information provided above, n. 13. An important corroboration is the finding in Vargyas,
Les prix, that the date harvest constituted a relief in the supply situation of the food market, resulting in
higher barley equivalents, that is, lower barley prices. As we explain later, this assumption can be
defended in times of famine, when the vital need is for any calories. Barley and dates are thus considered
simply as sources of kilocalories, and hence as substitutes.
18 See, for instance, V. H. W. Dowson, Dates and date cultivation of the ‘Iraq, Agricultural Directorate
of Mesopotamia, part 1, 1921, p. 41.
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most part, to manors and royal storage facilities.19 Although they show that in plentiful
years there may have been some carryover,20 it was rarely of any significance. Beveridge
concurs, concluding that little in the way of grain was stored beyond the following
harvest.21
Similarly, Jursa estimates that storage in Babylonia during the first millennium BCE was
minimal, mostly because of the socioeconomic situation. He argues that, in order to meet
tax requirements, the big producers (that is, the temples) were forced to sell the lion’s share
of their cash-crop production immediately after harvest. Having revealed a seasonal pattern
in the sales of dates from the Ebabbar temple in Sippar (with dates usually being described
as the temple’s main cash crop), he concludes that ‘by and large the temple did not hoard
dates with the intention of making them available to outsiders after the intensive phase of
selling following the harvest’.22 In other words, the tax demand of the central government
meant that the temples were unable to store commodities on a large scale, with the aim
of selling them in the following year.
In addition, among the price quotations in the ‘Astronomical diaries’ (ADs) one finds
several observations of ‘old’ and ‘new’ barley and dates, but most of them refer to the
new harvest and therefore do not prove that carryovers existed. Indeed, new barley gener-
ally appears in the texts during the harvest period (Babylonian months I and II). This
‘new’ (esˇsˇu) barley is always cheaper, and either replaces barley without additional attribute
(as in AD 308)23 or runs parallel to it (S/W texts 9 and 12).24 In either case the price
decreases. A clear example is given in Table 1, where one can see that the prices rise until
day fifteen, when the new barley enters the market, and that at that point they begin to
fall. This pattern can be best explained as an effect of the supply increase, with the arrival
of the new crop, rather than as a change in quality. Again, we have failed to find any solid
evidence that inter-annual storage was available for barley.
‘New dates’ followed the same pattern. It is not surprising that at harvest time, when
supply rose, prices for both barley and dates fell, that of dates by about twice as much as
that of barley: about 20% and 10%, respectively. The fact that dried (¼ old) dates have a
higher weight per litre and a higher sugar content than do fresh ones accounts for the differ-
ence in the percentage of the price declines for fresh dates and fresh barley. In fact, this pat-
tern is widespread. In his study of Roman Egypt, for instance, Drexhage reports fresh dates
to have been cheaper than dried dates.25
The only extant reference to either old or new dates outside the harvest season is
recorded on the cuneiform tablet S/W text 6. The most plausible explanation is that it refers
19 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’.
20 Ibid., p. 174.
21 William H. Beveridge, ‘The yield and price of corn in the Middle Ages’, Economic History Review, 1,
1927, pp. 155–67.
22 Jursa, Aspects, pp. 591–2.
23 That is, specified by neither ‘old’ nor ‘new’.
24 S/W text x: text number in Alice Slotsky and Ronald Wallenfels, Tallies and trends: the late Babylonian
commodity price lists, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2010.
25 Hans-Joachim Drexhage, Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Lo¨hne in ro¨mischen A¨gypten,
St Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1992, p. 36.
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to inter-annual storage. If the standard dates were the ones most recently harvested, in the
autumn of 138 BCE, then the dates designated as old must be from an earlier harvest. Evid-
ence referring to ‘old’ produce, defined here as produce stored for longer than a year, is thus
very meagre in the rich corpus of Late Babylonian price records, which amount to more
than 3,500 observations. This finding is consistent with the contention that the economic
impact of carryover was minimal during the Late Babylonian era.
There is considerable indirect evidence of small-scale storage in both Hellenistic Babylo-
nia and medieval England associated with periods of famine, most notably the great Euro-
pean famine of 1315–17. Since it is difficult to establish what each of the various
chroniclers and historiographers of the two societies under study meant by ‘famine’, we
shall define it broadly enough to include food crises characterized ‘by rising prices, popular
discontent and hunger, in the worst cases leading to death by disease or starvation’, rather
than restricting it to cases of mass starvation.26 This broader definition enables us to com-
pare the two datasets and, more specifically, to analyse the correlation of famine with extre-
mely high prices, as is often done in the literature on both England27 and Babylon.28
Table 1. Barley prices (shekels/100 litres) in Babylonian month II 186 SE (27 April–25 May 126 BCE in the
Julian calendar).
Commodity Designation Day Price (shekels/100 litres)
Barley ––– day 1 5.56 (2.86)
until day 7 5.00
days 8–10 5.56
day 11 until end of
month
4.76
new day 15 2.78
days 16–17 2.22
day 18 2.78
days 19–22 3.03
day 26 until end of
month
2.50
Source: Slotsky and Wallenfels, Tallies and trends, text 9.
26 Peter Garnsey, ‘Famine in history’, in P. Garnsey, ed., Cities, peasants and food in classical antiquity,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998, p. 275. Note, however, that the Babylonian famine
threshold employed seems to meet one important criterion of famine as defined more narrowly, namely a
‘collapse of the social, political, and moral order’ (Garnsey, ‘ Famine’, p. 275). This, at least, is how we
would interpret the fact that parents were reported to sell their children in order to fend off starvation.
Cormac O´’Gra´da, Famine: a short history, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 3–7,
likewise offers a pragmatic definition of famine.
27 W. G. Hoskins, ‘Harvest fluctuations and English economic history 1480–1619’, Agricultural History
Review, 12, 1964, pp. 28–46; idem, ‘Harvest fluctuations and English economic history 1620–1759’,
Agricultural History Review, 16, 1968, pp. 15–31. Hoskins defines famine years as those when the price
was more than 10% above a thirty-one-year moving average.
28 Vargyas, Les prix; Robartus van der Spek, ‘How to measure prosperity? The case of Hellenistic
Babylonia’, in R. Descat et al., eds., Approches de l’e´conomie helle´nistique, Paris: Entretiens
d’Arche´ologie et d’Histoire, St Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, 2006, pp. 287–310.
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On average, England experienced famine as often as every ten to fifteen years,29 which is
evidence in its own right of the lack of large-scale inter-annual storage. As for Babylon, we
are fortunate to have the so-called ‘siege documents’, edited by Oppenheim, which provide dir-
ect evidence of what Babylonians themselves considered famine prices.30 However, the prices
in these documents are mere formulations rather than actual sale prices (in the style of ‘barley
costs a million nowadays’) and are therefore conspicuously high.31 In all cases, these prices
ranged between 8.3 and 50 shekels per 100 litres of barley. The more reliable famine prices
recorded in the ‘Astronomical diaries’ are considerably lower. In fact, several passages in the
historical sections of the same tablets report that famines could be so severe that residents of
the city of Babylon were obliged to sell their children in order to stave off starvation, a phenom-
enon also reported in the siege documents. Using these data, based on the notations of contem-
porary Babylonian scribes, van der Spek calculates that famine conditions can be said to have
prevailed when one shekel could buy 39 litres of barley.32 We set the food price slightly lower,
at 40 litres per shekel, but add a constraint: the prices of both barley and dates must rise to
this level or higher for the term ‘famine’ to be applicable, since barley and dates contain
roughly the same number of kilocalories per litre, making the cheaper of the two the logical
choice when starvation threatens. Using this method, we can identify nine famines in the 133
years for which we have data, a rate that works out at roughly one famine every fourteen years.
This relatively high famine frequency, in both England and Babylon, clearly indicates
that carryovers of any significance were not a standard practice. We can formalize this con-
clusion by estimating the expected time that it will take for a famine to occur, given a cer-
tain level of inter-annual storage. The first step is to calculate the standard deviation of
agricultural output: a straightforward calculation in the case of one crop, but in England
we have wheat and barley and in Babylon barley and dates. These two pairs of crops are
far from equivalent. Since England’s wheat and barley have more characteristics in common
(both being grain crops harvested in the summer) than do Babylon’s barley and dates (the
latter being a fruit harvested in the autumn), it follows that the output of wheat and barley
in England is more closely correlated than that of barley and dates in Babylon. This discrep-
ancy has an impact on the standard deviation, and hence on the likelihood of famines. Since
the standard deviation is simply the square root of the variance, we combine, for simplicity’s
sake, the variances of the two series: that is, we treat barley and dates as a perfect pair of
substitutes. This assumption can be defended since, when threatened by famine, people
maximize their calorie intake,33 and dates and barley have approximately the same per-litre
caloric content,34 permitting us to convert quantities into calories. Thus we start with
29 Donald N. McCloskey, ‘English open fields as behavior towards risk’, in P. Uselding, ed., Research in
economic history, vol. 1, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1976, p. 144.
30 A. Leo Oppenheim, ‘Siege documents from Nippur’, Iraq, 17, 1955, pp. 69–89.
31 This has also been shown by Israel Eph’al The city besieged: siege and its manifestations in the ancient
Near East, Leiden: Brill, 2009; he argues that these prices are best considered as literary topoi of little
historical value.
32 Van der Spek, ‘How to measure prosperity?’. His estimate confirms the earlier assumption of Peter
Vargyas, who made 50 litres per shekel the famine threshold: Vargyas, Les prix.
33 See also the text above and notes 13 and 17 on the important role of dates in the Mesopotamian diet and
more particularly on the price-alleviating effect of the date harvest on barley prices.
34 Jursa, Aspects , p. 51.
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X  ðmX ;s2XÞ
Y  ðmY ;s2Y Þ
where m and s2 denote the mean and the variance of the series X and Y, respectively, and s
and z are their variances. Next, combining the totals of the two variables, we get
Z ¼ X þ Y
where the new series Z has a mean mX þ mY and, if the two elements are uncorrelated, the
variance is simply the sum of their individual variances. In case the series are correlated, as is
the case in England, Z (i.e. the level of output) remains unchanged, but the variance
becomes:
s2Z ¼ s2X þ s2Y þ 2  sXY
where sXY is the covariance of X and Y. In other words, if the two series are positively cor-
related, both the variance of the sum of the series and the standard deviation will increase
even further.
McCloskey and Nash assumed for England the standard deviation of crop production to
have a value of 35 (with mean 100) and set the famine level at 50.35 This figure seems to be
somewhat low, since even during the Great Famine the decline in output amounted to only
about 38% for wheat and 26% for barley, which means that even a 35–40% drop in pro-
duction occurred only in exceptional situations such as the Great Famine. Estimated
directly, the combined variance of barley and wheat output for England between 1252
and 1345 is 28.1 million.36 As for the subseries, the variance for wheat in England is 18.5
million and for barley 8.5 million, with a correlation between the two series of 0.04. Apply-
ing the above equation, we arrive at 18.5þ8.5þ2.0.04(0.04)18.50.58.50.5 ¼ 28.1 million,
being the same as the sum of the variances of the two series. Taking the square root and
dividing by the mean results in a coefficient of variation of roughly 13, substantially lower
than the 35 used by McCloskey and Nash, their figures being extremes occurring only dur-
ing terrible crises. Even if we look at individual manors, we rarely find coefficients of vari-
ation exceeding 35.37 However, correlations of yields between the regions in England are
around 0.4–0.5, suggesting that the coefficient of variance for overall output is lower than
it is for individual series. Indeed, as O´ Gra´da´ argues, famines such as the Great European
one were fairly infrequent, since ‘given that life expectancy was low even in non-crisis years,
frequent famines would have made it impossible to sustain population’.38
Obtaining similar information for Babylon is complicated by the fact that we are work-
ing with prices rather than output data. Jursa gives the output per hectare for barley as
35 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’, p. 176. Their estimates of the parameters and the average
waiting time between two famines are based on McCloskey, ‘English open fields’.
36 This estimate is based on the data underlying Broadberry et al., ‘British economic growth’.
37 Bruce M. S. Campbell (2007), ‘Three centuries of English crops yields, 1211–1491’, http://www.
cropyields.ac.uk/ (consulted 10 April 2011).
38 Cormac O´ Gra´da´, ‘Making famine history’, Journal of Economic Literature, 45, 1, 2007, p. 8. See also
the distinction between food shortage and famine made by Garnsey, ‘Famine’.
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1,728 litres, while one hectare of dates yielded around 5,328 litres.39 Clearly, these figures
reflect mean yields and thus do not tell us much about the variance, but they do say some-
thing about the relationship between barley and dates. If we assume that the annual vari-
ance of barley production is equal to that of date production, and that the mean output
of dates is much higher than for barley, this would suggest a correspondingly lower coeffi-
cient of variation. Indeed, among present-day Middle Eastern countries that produce a sub-
stantial quantity of dates and barley, the annual coefficient of variation of dates is about
half that of barley.40 The standard deviation of the barley output for Babylon, which we
proxy by using barley output in medieval England, should be considered the upper limit,
since grain-output volatility in medieval England was greater than it is today because of
changes in the quality of the grain itself and since Babylon profited from a fairly sophistic-
ated irrigation system. We thus conclude, in line with the literature, that barley and dates
were produced in equal quantities and that the variance of dates was half that of barley.
Furthermore, given the recent data from the Food and Agricultural Organization, the second
assumption is that barley and dates have a negative correlation coefficient of 0.55.41 In
other words, a failed barley harvest is often followed by an above-average date harvest,
possibly because barley and dates react differently to climatic factors. This means that the rel-
ative variance in Babylon becomes 8.5þ8.5.0.5þ2(0.55)8.50.5.8.50.5¼3.4 million. Given the
total hypothetical output of barley and dates of 16 million bushels, we end up with a
coefficient of variation of 6%. In other words, the presence of dates reduces by nearly 50%
the relative standard deviation of agricultural output for Babylon.
Using these standard deviations and the resulting famine lines (the percentage below
which a harvest must drop before one can declare food-supply conditions to be bad enough
to rate the term ‘famine’), we use Monte Carlo simulations (500 experiments at a time) in
order to estimate how many years, at a given famine line and level of carryover, will separ-
ate one famine from the next (see Appendix). As one can see, in Table 2, assuming no stor-
age and a famine line of 90 (a 10% failed harvest) yields an approximately correct period
between two famines for Babylon (roughly 19 years). For England, an assumed famine
line of 90 and 0% carryover results in an inter-famine period of only 3.5 years, which works
out to a frequency rate, even with a 10% carryover, that is implausibly high. Since not only
the per-person output of medieval English agriculture but also its volatility was higher than
that of Hellenistic Babylonia, the English famine line must have been closer to 80 than to
90, or famines would have been so frequent that population levels could not have been sus-
tained.
However, in both cases any storage above 1% of total output is highly unlikely, since the
interval between famines would have been in the range of 88–501 years for Babylon and
51–212 years for England. In other words, had there been extensive storage, famines and
39 Jursa, Aspects, pp. 48–53. Both values come from the northern Babylonian town of Sippar.
40 Calculated from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), ResourceSTAT: land-use domain, 2010,
http://faostat.fao.org/site/377/default.aspx#ancor (consulted 10 April 2011), taking into consideration
only those countries where the two crops have an almost identical share in total output.
41 Calculated from the FAO, ProductionSTAT: crop-use domain, 2010, http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/
default.aspx#ancor (consulted 10 April 2011), taking into consideration only those Middle Eastern
countries where the two crops have almost identical shares in total output.
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food would have been far less frequent than is indicated by extant records from the two per-
iods in question.
Benefits in a cost-benefit analysis of storage
In the previous section we argued that in both Hellenistic Babylon and medieval England the
practice of crop storage was insignificant in scope. The dual crop structure that existed in
Babylon did not seem to have any effect on that finding, for it reduced intra- (and inter-)
annual price fluctuation but this meant a decrease in the standard deviation of the harvest
and, by extension, in the frequency of famines. The next question is: why were carryovers
so small?
For McCloskey and Nash, the explanation is simply that storage was prohibitively
expensive in medieval England.42 In order to test this hypothesis and also to determine
whether it can be extended to Babylon, we assess the potential benefits of storage in each
of the two cases and only then address the issue of storage costs, leaving our discussion of
cost-benefit discrepancies until later.
With the model of McCloskey and Nash as our point of departure, we proceed on the
assumption that not only intra-annual price changes but also inter-annual carryovers are
equal to changes in the costs of storage, since inter-harvest prices track storage costs. After
all, storing grain makes economic sense only if the benefits outweigh the costs. If the price
increase is sufficient to make storage, despite its costs, profitable, then the storage rate will
increase, in turn pushing up the price to the point at which the marginal costs and benefits
are equal. McCloskey and Nash, as well as Clark, claim that the costs of storage consist of
rental costs of a barn, losses (spoiled grain and theft), and, most importantly, foregone earn-
ings, best approximated by the interest rate on capital.43
Table 2. Expected number of years between famines for various famine lines and carryovers (average produc-
tion ¼100)
Country
Famine line
relative to 100
Carryover (%)
0 1 5 10
England 70 93.9 167.3 2,499.0 72,915.7
80 15.1 18.8 50.7 212.4
90 3.5 3.7 4.7 6.3
Babylon 70 Inf. Inf. Inf. Inf.
80 2,332.3 8,292.8 Inf. Inf.
90 19.9 25.9 87.6 501.2
Note: 500 simulations; standard deviations: England 13, Babylon 6.
42 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’.
43 Ibid.; Clark, ‘Cost of capital’.
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First, we need to determine the monthly increase in prices after harvest, using the meth-
ods of McCloskey and Nash. In England, harvest time for winter wheat was May/June and
for spring barley early September. We will use wheat in our example, since it was the dom-
inant crop, and September as the benchmark, thus making it easier to take account of the
barley harvest. We can rewrite this as annual growth per month. In Table 3b, based on
Table 3a, we take the average in the north-east corner above the month pair: for instance,
for October–November we take the average of all growth rates above the combination
October–November in the matrix.44 The annual price increase for wheat is 24.4%. One
should bear in mind that this estimation technique is based on the premise of a single annual
harvest. If two equally important crops are harvested half a year apart, as was the case in
Babylon, taking the average of the growth rates of the complete north-east corner will result
in an overestimation of the growth (or, to describe it from a cost perspective, the price
decline after the second harvest).
Tables 4a and 4b illustrate the situation in Babylon for barley. Again using the north-
east corner of the matrix to calculate monthly averages, we arrive at an annual net revenue
of no less than 37.8%. This was about 13 percentage points higher than in England, but in
reality annual benefits must have been less impressive, since we can see that during the three
months immediately after the date harvest the monthly growth rates shifted into negative
territory (see the diagonal in Table 4a), partly on account of the new date harvest and partly
on account of anticipation of the barley harvest to come in the spring. Because the north-
east corner includes the positive growth rates on both sides of the harvest, the average is
inordinately high, so we perform a separate calculation for the growth rate from December
on, by using the north-east corner prior to December.45 We thereby arrive at an annual
potential profit from storage of 15.3%.
When we perform the same exercise for dates (see Tables 5a and 5b), we arrive at aver-
age annual benefits amounting to 31.0%, and, because the barley harvest depressed the
price of dates, the potential benefits of storage reach 50.4%, which is an overestimate. In
January–February the price increased by as much as 15% because, as we pointed out in
the previous section, at this time of year the price at issue was that of dried, not fresh, dates.
When we factor in this anomaly, the increase amounts to only16.0%, which is about the
same as for barley in Babylon but much lower than for wheat in England.46
In sum, it is clear that, when the differences in agricultural structure of the two regions
are accounted for, the intra-annual price change in Babylon proves to be significantly lower
than the one in England: 16% as opposed to 24.4%, for each region’s two crops combined.
This discrepancy may explain why Slotksy contended that the Babylonian price data offer
44 For example, for September–October, the growth rate is the average of September–October, September–
November, September–December, etc. For October–November, the growth rate is the average of
October–November, October–December, October–January, etc., and September–November, September–
December, etc.
45 For example, for February–March we take the averages of February–March, February–April, and
February–May, and January–March, January–April, and January–May.
46 We calculate the average of the north-east corner separately from that of April (i.e., the barley harvest)
onwards. For January and February, we omit the high growth rates, since they were caused by the switch
from fresh to dried dates.
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no evidence of seasonality,47 a contention that has come under criticism.48 If one applies the
method of McCloskey and Nash without factoring in the dual crop structure, one gets inter-
harvest price increases of 37.8% and 31.0% for barley and dates respectively: evidence that
potential profits from inter-annual storage in Babylon were sharply reduced by the dual
crop structure. This alone, however, is just one side of the coin: the cost of storage is the
other.
Costs in a cost-benefit analysis of storage
We have seen that, whereas in England the annual benefits of crop storage may have
amounted to as much as 25%, in Babylon, mostly on account of the particularities of its
dual crop structure, the average was at best around 16%. This suggests that costs had to
be minimal for any benefits to accrue to storage. The costs, as pointed out in the introduc-
tion, consisted mostly of three items: foregone investment, barn rental, and loss of stored
grain to spoilage.
McCloskey and Nash note that in medieval England barn rental constituted only a small
portion of total storage costs.49 Moreover, there is considerable evidence that there was far
less investment in the construction and renovation of barns than of houses. Around 1300, a
year’s house rental was roughly the equivalent of 15 bushels (or about 525 litres) of barley,
a price that the Black Death would slash in half.50 As for Babylon, Jursa estimates that
house rental cost a minimum of 3–4 shekels a year, the equivalent of about 400 litres of bar-
ley, and somewhere between one month’s and two months’ wages for full-time work in the
sixth century BCE.51 Since presumably, as was the case in medieval England, house rental
was higher than barn rental, it is unlikely that the latter exceeded 6% of the annual value
of the grain stored.52 We thus conclude that the cost of renting a barn in Babylon was
slightly lower than that of renting a barn in England.
Table 3b. Average monthly increases in wheat prices in England, 1270–1345
September–October 3.30% March–April 2.15%
October–November 3.00% April–May 1.71%
November–December 2.49% May–June 1.30%
December–January 2.29% June–July 0.96%
January–February 2.51% July–August 0.02%
February–March 2.39%
47 Slotsky, The bourse.
48 Temin, ‘Price behavior’; Foldvari and van Leeuwen, ‘Structural analysis’.
49 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’, pp. 182–3.
50 Gregory Clark, ‘The condition of the working-class in England, 1209–2004’, Journal of Political
Economy, 113, 6, 2005, pp. 1307–40.
51 Jursa, Aspects, p. 686.
52 G. E. Fussel, ed., Robert Loder’s farm accounts: 1610–20, London: Camden Society, 1936, pp. 158–9.
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The costs of spoilage during storage follow the same pattern. For England, Overton and
Campbell estimate these losses to have been about 10% per annum.53 While we do not have
comparable data for Babylon, Adamson shows that the loss rate in ancient Egypt was about
10%, whereas he sets the rate for Mesopotamia somewhat higher, on account of its less
favourable climate.54 Numerous references to the threat to stored produce posed by fungi
and lichens are to be found in Babylonian scientific literature, indicating how serious this
was. One line of the omen collection sˇumma alu dealing with various terrestrial phenomena
reads: ‘If there is green fungus in a storage bin, there will be no grain in the man’s house’.55
The mere fact that an entire tablet (comprising about 120 omens) was dedicated to pro-
blems posed by these two crop destroyers speaks volumes. In general, storage losses were
likely to be lower for dates than for grain; combined loss was probably on average about
10%. While this estimate has a wide margin of error, it is safe to say that storage losses con-
stituted a small share of total losses, so the question of the degree of this figure’s accuracy is
academic.
This brings us to interest rates, the most important and most discussed (perhaps because
the most complex) variable. They ranged from 10% on standard loans to more than 50%
on consumption credit. The fact that they can be calculated in a number of different ways
further complicates the situation. Suppose that a farmer who had been granted consumption
credit shortly before the next harvest – that is, before grain prices begin to decline – had to
repay the equivalent of two bushels of barley. Shortly after the harvest, when the price of
grain had fallen by half, the cost of the credit would double, to the equivalent of four
bushels.
We summarize in Table 6 what little direct evidence we have regarding interest rates in
Babylon. Admittedly, most of these data – the promissory notes concerning the redemp-
tion of a silver (or, occasionally, a commodity) deposit – are to be interpreted as penalty
clauses, which were effective only after an initial interest-free period.56 These penalties
Table 4b. Average monthly increases in barley prices in Babylon, 350–60 BCE
June-July 4.28% December–January 4.44%
July–August 3.82% January–February 2.62%
August–September 4.22% February–March 1.32%
September–October 4.07% March–April 0.57%
October–November 3.93% April–May 0.87%
November–December 4.35%
53 Overton and Campbell, ‘Production’.
54 P. B. Adamson, ‘Problems over storing food in the ancient Near East’,Welt des Orients, 16, 1985, pp. 5–15.
55 Sally M. Freedman, If a city is set on a height, vol. 1 (OPSNKF 17), Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Museum, 1998.
56 See Michael Jursa, ‘Agricultural managing, tax farming and banking: aspects of entrepreneurial activity
in Babylonia in the late Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods’, in P. Briant and F. Joanne`s, eds., La
transition entre l’empire ache´me´nide et les royaumes helle´nistiques, Persika 9, Paris: De Boccard, 2006,
pp. 137–222.
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(compounded monthly) were, in effect, interest rates. It is most interesting that the per-
centage rate of these penalties on commodity loans was always higher than the rate on
official loans. For example, late Achaemenid ‘real’ interest rates ranged between 25%
and 40% per month for silver loans.57 Whereas the average interest rate on silver was
about 34% per annum, the rate on commodity loans occasionally reached 100%. Evi-
dently commodity loans were deemed high risk, even though the sums involved were rela-
tively small: only a few shekels, as opposed to an average of about 30 for silver. In
addition, payment was in kind, indicating that grain-loan borrowers were cash poor.
These interest rates are slightly higher than in medieval England, where, according to
Homer and Sylla,58 interest rates ranged between 10% for institutional loans59 and more
than 50% for individual loans.60 The interest-rate ranges for the two periods are remark-
ably similar in two key respects: not only did they share a very high range but they were
structurally similar as well. It was around 1220 that the term ‘interesse’, referring to a com-
pensation or penalty for delayed repayment of a loan, and thus a way to circumvent the
long-established usury laws, began to appear.61 This was a distant descendant of the penalty
clause in Babylonian contracts, according to which, after an initial interest-free period, a
monthly interest payment was imposed.
Our comparison of the interest rates in Babylon and England is further facilitated by the
existence of one element common to the two regions: livestock. As McCloskey and Nash
observe, the profit on capital investment in livestock – that is, the net annual output of an
animal divided by the total value of the animal – yields an estimate equivalent to the interest
rate.62 Of all the livestock candidates for the interest-rate comparison that follows, sheep
best suit our purposes, for three reasons: they constituted one of the dominant varieties of
livestock in both Babylon and England; they did not require costly feed, such as beans or
oats; and their reproduction rates eliminated the problem of depreciation. To describe the
57 Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, in A history of interest rates, 4th edn, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2005,
p. 27, point out that the Hammurabi Code had already set a higher maximum interest rate on loans in
grain than on loans in silver.
58 Ibid., p. 89.
59 See also Clark, ‘Cost of capital’.
60 See also McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’, p. 183.
61 Homer and Sylla, History, p. 17.
62 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’, pp. 183–4.
Table 5b. Average monthly increases in date prices in Babylon, 350–60 BCE
October–November 3.74% April–May 1.35%
November–December 5.49% May–June 1.08%
December–January 6.22% June–July 1.32%
January–February 3.44% July–August 0.87%
February–March 1.64% August–September 0.83%
March–April 1.54%
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Table 6. Interest rates in Babylonia
Text Interest rate Amount Date Commodity
and
transaction
Literature
NCBT 1052 25% p.a. (11/4
shekels per
mina per
month)
55 shekels of
silver
––– Promissory
note
Stolper 1990,
p. 22
UCLM 9–2918 40% p.a.
(2 shekels per
mina per
month)
70 shekels of
qaluˆ-silver
3 VIII 14 Art Promissory
note
Stolper 2000,
pp. 676f.
HSM
913.2.212
25% p.a. (11/4
shekels per
mina per
month)
2 minas of
qaluˆ-silver
6 IV 34 Art (I
or II)
Promissory
note
Stolper 1990,
p. 5
YBC 5331 30% p.a.a (11/2
shekels per
mina per
month)
161/2 shekels of
silver
VIII 35 Art (I
or II)
Promissory
note
Stolper 1990,
p. 14
BM 109977 80% p.a. (1
sutu per kurru
per month)
22 kurru of
dates
12 VI 15 Dar
II
Promissory
note (imittu)
Stolper 1990,
p. 9
HSM
913.2.220
25% p.a. (1 1/4
shekels per
mina per
month)
8 kurru of
barley
19 III 16 Dar II Promissory
note
Stolper 1990,
p. 7
CT 49 34 40% p.a.
(2 shekels per
mina per
month)
––– IX 3
Antigonus
Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 18
BM 62684 80% p.a.
(2 sutu per
kurru per
month)
120 litres of
dates
23 x 3 P.A Promissory
note
(redemption of
a date
deposit?)
Stolper 1992,
pp. A2–4
BM 77203 40% p.a.
(2 shekels per
mina per
month)
22 shekels of
silver
1 I 4
Antigonus
Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit?)
Stolper 1993,
pp. A2–6
BM 109974 10% p.a. (3
sutu per kurru)
8 kurru of fine
barley
11 XI 5?
Antigonus
Promissory
note
Stolper 1993,
pp. A2–8
HSM 893–5-
17
40% p.a.
(2 shekels per
mina per
month)
8 shekels of
silver
23 VII 6 Alex
IV
Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit?)
Stolper 1993,
pp. A2–10
Continues
M A R K E T S I N P R E - I N D U S T R I A L S O C I E T I E S j
j
187
Table 6. (Continued)
Text Interest rate Amount Date Commodity
and
transaction
Literature
CT 49 102 100% (p.a.?) 15 kurru of
white barley
24 SE? Promissory
note
(redemption of
a commodity
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 17
CT 49 106 40% p.a. (2
shekels per
mina per
month)
158.5 shekels
of silver
before 9! IX 35
SE
Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 12
BM 54555 80% p.a. (2
sutu per kurru
per month)
300 litres of
white, good-
quality barley
36 SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a commodity
deposit)
Jursa 1998,
p. 17
CT 49 111 40% p.a. (2
shekels per
mina per
month)
5 vats of prime
beer, 20 loaves
of good bread
13 IX 42 SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a commodity
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 13
BM 59748 20% p.a. (1
shekel per
mina per
month)
5 shekels of
silver
28 XII2 42
SE
Promissory
note (tithe)
Jursa 1998,
p. 16
CT 49 112 40% p.a. (2
shekels per
mina per
month)
1/2 mina of
silver
42? SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 16
BM 55437 40% p.a. (2
shekels per
mina per
month)
6 minas of
silver
4 V 46? SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 15
CT 49 116 40% p.a. (2
shekels per
mina per
month)
--- 49 SE Promissory
note?
(redemption of
a commodity
deposit)
Jursa 2006,
p.185
CT 49 119 80% p.a. (2
sutu per kurru
per month)
48 litres of
barley
28 X 51 SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a commodity
deposit)
Jursa 2006,
pp. 188f.
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situation more succinctly, in mathematical terms,
i  P ¼ R  C
where i is the interest rate, P is the price of a sheep, and R and C are the revenue and costs
of a sheep. Reformulating it in these terms, we get
i ¼ ðR=PÞ  ðC=PÞ
where the costs (C/P) are close to zero, indicating that the annual interest rate is nearly the
same as the annual revenue divided by the costs.
Taking as their example Crawley, the Hampshire estate of the Bishop of Winchester, for
the year 1250, McCloskey and Nash estimate that its sheepstock was worth £56 and that it
generated annual income earnings of £25 4s, or an interest rate of 45%.63 The calculation
for Babylon is simpler. Using silver talents as the unit of value, Aperghis estimates the over-
all value of the livestock consisting of 3,648 million sheep at 1,204, of their meat at 241,
and of their wool at 620, yielding an interest rate of 71.5%.64 This was lower than medieval
Table 6. (Continued)
Text Interest rate Amount Date Commodity
and
transaction
Literature
CT 49 120 80% p.a. (2
sutu per kurru
per month)
2 shekels of
silver
(convertible to
2 kurru of
barley after
first deadline)
XII 52 SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver/
commodity
deposit)
Jursa 2006,
pp. 189f.
CT 49 121 40% p.a. (2
shekels per
mina per
month)
80 shekels of
silver
54 SE Promissory
note
(redemption of
a silver
deposit)
Stolper 1993,
p. 14
CT 39 133 25% p.a.(?) 40 shekels of
silver
25 [VII] 96 SE Silver deposit Stolper 1993,
p. 10
CT 49 134 25% p.a.(?) 40 shekels of
silver
19 [VII] 100
SE
Silver deposit Stolper 1993,
p. 11
a Jursa, ‘Agricultural managing’, p.161: missed deadline.
Sources: Matthew Stolper, ‘Late Achaemenid legal texts from Uruk and Larsa’, Baghdader Mitteilungen, 21,
1990, pp. 559–622; idem, ‘Late Achaemenid, Early Macedonian, and Early Seleucid records of deposit and
related texts’, AION supplement 77, Naples, 1993; idem, ‘Buildings on bow lands and encumbrances on
buildings’, in R. Dittmann et al., eds., Variatio delectat: Iran und der Westen (Fs. P. Calmeyer), Mu¨nster:
Ugarit Verlag, 2000; Michael Jursa, Der Tempelzehnt in Babylonien vom siebenten bis zum dritten
Jahrhundert v. Chr., AOAT 254, Mu¨nster: Ugarit Verlag, 1998; idem, ‘Agricultural managing’.
63 Ibid.
64 G. G. Aperghis, ‘ABACUS historical modeling system’, unpublished paper for ‘Long-term Quantification
in Ancient Mediterranean History’ conference, Brussels, November 2009.
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England’s maximum rate for consumption loans, which could carry interest rates of up to
100%. However, in England the cost of such produce, being relatively abundant, was rela-
tively low, as indicated by McCloskey and Nash’s estimated interest rate for Crawley in
1250, noted above. Thus interest rates in Babylon, contrary to the indications of the
McCloskey–Nash model, were probably slightly higher than in medieval England.
If we assume, in line with our discussion of the benefits of storage, the average annual
benefits of storage in medieval England to be about 25%, it follows that only institutions
and wealthy merchants would store grain. Such benefits would only be attractive to some-
body for whom interest rates were below 10–15%, on top of a barn-rental rate of 5%
and a storage-loss rate of 5–10%. Even in such cases, however, it was only profitable in
exceptional circumstances. In Babylon, the storage-loss rate was the same as in England,
whereas the interest rate (opportunity costs) was higher. When we add to the calculation
a smaller profit from inter-annual storage, its exploitation by wealthy merchants in Babylon
is even more unlikely than for their peers in England. Small-scale farmers, however, are
another matter, since they did not have the same access to capital and therefore did not
pay such high interest rates, and yet we found that they did not store grain to any significant
extent. The question of why they did not do so is the subject of our next and last analysis.
The role of small-scale farmers
It is not surprising that in Babylon large institutions and wealthy merchants enjoyed such
lucrative alternative opportunities that they would find the practice of storing grain to be
profitable only in exceptional cases, in light of the fact that the interest rate on small loans
was relatively high. What is surprising is how little of such storage was done by farmers at
the other end of the scale: peasants whose profit margin was too slim to allow for invest-
ment in the capital market, and who therefore were not burdened with high opportunity
costs.
Indeed, we find that in both Babylon and England small-scale farmers who chose to
invest were obliged to pay a much higher interest rate than did major institutions, an indica-
tion that their credit worthiness was suspect. In England the problem was compounded by
commodity loans that had to be repaid in cash on unfavourable terms. Standard operating
procedure was to borrow at the point, just before the harvest, when farmers ran out of
seed or, worse yet, out of food, and repay the loan after the harvest. According to our
data, prices would meanwhile have fallen by 20%. In other words, the monetary value of
2 bushels before the harvest at 20% interest was equivalent to that of 3 bushels after the
harvest, making in effect an overall interest rate of 50%, and not just the 20% established
in the pre-harvest contract.
As for Babylon, the interest rate on small loans that were to be repaid in barley or dates
was much higher than the rate for larger loans to be repaid in silver. Flynn and Gı´raldez the-
orize that silver was highly valued because so little of it was in circulation. Repayment in
kind was discouraged, by keeping the interest rate on it high, in order to prompt borrowers
to part with their silver instead.65 This theory corroborates one of ours: that high interest
rates were due to a low level of monetization and to a paucity of silver in circulation.
65 Dennis Flynn and Arturo Gı´raldez, ‘Cycles of silver: global economic unity through the mid-eighteenth
century’, Journal of World History, 13, 2, 2002, pp. 391–427.
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The sort of silver loans discussed thus far, made as they were to high temple officials
and entrepreneurs with a certain cash liquidity, were by definition an urban phenomenon.
Those engaged in small-scale farming, necessarily in more or less remote rural areas,
lacked access to capital markets. The late Achaemenid (late fifth century BCE) promissory
notes from Nippur, in southern Babylonia, preserved in the Murasˇuˆ archive (and those
from several other smaller archives), show that in rural areas it was specialized entrepre-
neurs who extended credit to tenants of ‘fiefs’ (the term is used here simply to denote
land on which service was incumbent in a general way, and not as part of any feudal system
along the lines of medieval Europe’s). This was not for the purpose of paying taxes but to
increase the productivity of property.66 This was for the purpose of fulfilling tax obligation
rather than to increase the productivity of property. Other archival materials reveal that
with the reign of Darius I (523–486 BCE) the tax burden began to increase.67 Again, as
in the case of silver loans, credit for the purpose of improving productivity – for instance,
in the form of trading partnerships known as harranu – was a strictly urban and upper-class
affair,68 as opposed to consumption loans made to small-scale farmers in either Babylon or
England.
There were two reasons why most small-scale farmers could not afford to store their
harvests, despite the fact that their opportunity costs were low (if only because capital mar-
kets were out of reach). Lack of collateral meant that small commodity loans carried prohi-
bitively high interest rates, and the requirement to repay loans for more immediate needs left
them without the means to engage in the speculative tactic of storing grain for sale in the
following year. Indeed, if the temple in Ebabbar could not afford to store grain, it is all
the more unlikely that small-scale farmers could do so.69 In addition, Babylon’s high famine
line of 90 meant that famine was an ever-present threat. The potential benefit of low oppor-
tunity costs was nullified by the combination of this famine threat with a heavy tax burden,
rendering impracticable the use of crop storage as a means of manipulating market prices,
and thereby enhancing profitability.70 Instead, inter-annual carryover must have been
mostly a matter of seasonal leftovers, and storage on the part of the government.
66 The system was first described by Matthew Stolper, Entrepreneurs and empire: the Murasˇuˆ archive, the
Murasˇuˆ firm, and Persian rule in Babylonia, Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te
_Istanbul, 1985; regarding credit, see pp. 104–7. The most recent description of the system is to be found
in Jursa, Aspects, pp.198–203. Jursa, Aspects, pp. 60, 252, emphasizes that the dependence of these
small-scale farmers ‘on outside funds in order to be able to fulfil their tax obligations’ was considered
‘potentially disruptive to the economy’.
67 Michael Jursa and Caroline Waerzeggers, ‘On aspects of taxation in Achaemenid Babylonia: new
evidence from Borsippa’, in P. Briant and M. Chauveau, eds., Organisation des pouvoirs et contacts
culturels dans les pays de l’empire ache´me´nide, Persika 14, Paris: De Bocard, 2009, pp. 237–69.
68 Jursa, Aspects, pp. 206–8. On the distinction between rural consumption loans and urban credit for
business activities, see also the summary remarks in C. Wunsch, ‘Debt, interest, pledge, and forfeiture in
the Neo-Babylonian and early Achaemenid period: the evidence from the private archives’, in M. Hudson
and M. van der Mieroop, eds., Debt and economic renewal in the Ancient Near East, Bethesda, MD:
CDL Press, 2002, pp. 249–50.
69 Jursa, Aspects.
70 For a similar argument regarding subsistence and famine frequency, see O´ Gra´da´, ‘Making famine
history’, p. 8.
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Conclusion
When it comes to the market in foodstuffs, storage is one of the best ways to reduce risk and
thus maximize market efficiency. Drawing on a large food-price dataset that has only recently
been made available, we estimate possible storage for Hellenistic Babylonia and medieval
England. Our comparison of the extent of food storage in these two regions is based on the
model of McCloskey and Nash, which we are obliged to modify in order to capture the diver-
gence between the agricultural structures of the two regions. In England, wheat and barley
were comparable crops, with an annual production correlation close to zero, permitting us
to combine their variances, a step that yields rather high annual price fluctuations and there-
fore equally high potential profits. In Babylon, the fact that the production of dates was nega-
tively correlated with that of barley indicates that the effect of a meagre harvest of one of
these two crops could be offset by an abundant harvest of the other, reducing the standard
deviation of total crop output, and thus price volatility, to a level at which it was less profit-
able to store in Hellenistic Babylonia than it was in medieval England.
We find little evidence for any substantial storage in either of the regions. For large-scale
merchants, costs outweighed benefits, especially in the case of Babylon, where seasonality,
and therefore potential benefits, were less significant than they were in England. Nor do
we find evidence for any significant inter-annual storage on the part of small-scale farmers,
whose access to capital markets was limited, and who thus had low opportunity costs. A
plausible explanation for this situation is the immense tax burden on Babylonians, which
obliged even the large temples to sell their agricultural products as soon as possible after
the harvest.
We also find that, even though potential benefits (that is, seasonality) in Babylon were
lower than they were in England, this does not hold for interest rates, which were the
main component of costs. This finding, combined with the limited possibilities of loans to
small-scale farmers, suggests that interest rates were largely set outside the agricultural sec-
tor. This contradicts the finding of McCloskey and Nash that interest rates are, as a rule,
positively correlated with seasonality over time within one region.71 In reality, this is not
necessarily the case across two or more regions, even if both regions are pre-modern and
overwhelmingly agricultural.
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71 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’, p. 183.
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Appendix: a Monte Carlo simulation of the impact of
storage on famine
In order to explore the possible impact of storage on hunger, we have applied a Monte
Carlo simulation. The model is based on the following assumptions:
1. The production (P) is a normally distributed random variable with an expected value of
100 and a standard deviation differing by region (13 in England, 6 in Babylon).
2. The famine limit (F) is 70, 80, or 90. When the production (P) drops below this level, no
grain is stored; when the consumption (C) is below this limit, stored grain is consumed
until the consumption reaches the famine limit or the storage is emptied.
3. The storage mechanism works as follows: when the production is less than or equal to
the famine limit, people consume all the produced grain, none is stored, and, as
described in point 2, the stockpile (S) may even be reduced. When the production is
above the limit, a fixed percentage, denoted by a (0, 1, 5 or 10%), of the production
above the hunger limit is stored.
4. Although it is evident that some of the stored grain will be spoiled, we operate on the
assumption that it is not, in order to keep the model as simple as possible.
The model is the following algebraically:
if Pt>Ft : St ¼ St1 þ aðPt  Ft Þ and Ct ¼ Pt  aðPt  Ft Þ
if Pt  Ft&St1  Ft  Pt : St ¼ St1  ðPt  Ft Þ and Ct ¼ Ft
if Pt  Ft&St1<Ft  Pt : St ¼ 0 and Ct ¼ Pt þ St1
In the Monte Carlo simulation we generate a series with 3,500 observation (simulating
3,500 years), and we run the experiment with an initial storage of zero assumed 500 times
under different assumptions regarding the key parameters of the model. For each of the 500
experiments we save the number of years during which the consumption falls below the
famine limit. The average of these divided by 3,500 gives the estimate of the probability
of famine (p). In order to estimate the average waiting time between two famines, we
use a geometric distribution with parameter p, which has the probability mass function:
(1  p)kp. The average waiting time is simply the expected value, that is, 1p
p
.
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